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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
The Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment 
Foreword 
Neil M. Richards* 
It is customary among lawyers to divide the history of 
constitutional law at the Supreme Court into chapters defined by the 
serving Chief Justice. We refer, of course, to the Marshall Court, the 
Warren Court, and, more recently to the Rehnquist Court, which 
began with the elevation of William Hubbs Rehnquist from Associate 
Justice to Chief Justice in 1986 and ended with his death on 
September 3, 2005. The late Chief’s death marks the end of such a 
twenty-year chapter. It also marks the end of the longest-serving 
Court in modern times. From August 1994, when Justice Stephen 
Breyer joined the Court, until the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
eleven years later, the nine-Justice membership of the so-called 
“Second Rehnquist Court” remained stable. Although often deeply 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I would like to 
thank the symposium participants for a deeply stimulating day of engagement. In addition to the 
scholars whose work is published in this volume, special thanks are due to the other participants 
who served as moderators, commentators, and/or provocateurs: Jack Balkin, David Bernstein, 
Dan Mandelker, Martin Redish, Jennifer Rothman, and Jonathan Zittrain. Thanks also to two 
former deans of our law school, Joel Seligman and Dan Keating, for providing institutional 
support for this conference, and to the student editors of this journal, especially Heather Buethe, 
for their tireless hard work and enthusiasm. 
 Finally, I owe a personal debt of gratitude to the late Chief Justice, William Hubbs 
Rehnquist, that goes far beyond the present endeavor. This was never conceived as a memorial 
symposium, and ended up being unfortunate in its timing. Those of us who knew and worked 
with the late Chief will miss his warmth, his intellect, and his sense of humor. Our lives and our 
profession are diminished by his absence.  
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divided on important questions of constitutional and federal law, this 
Court had a unique opportunity to place its distinctive stamp on 
American law. With the departure of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
and with other retirements likely over the next few years, it is not 
overly dramatic to suggest that we are witnessing the end of an 
important era. 
What, then, will be the legacy of the Rehnquist Court? Although it 
is too early to say with certainty, it is safe to hazard a guess that it 
will be remembered as a relatively conservative Court, particularly 
interested in policing the lines between federal and state power in 
areas such as the federal commerce power, state sovereign immunity, 
and criminal procedure. Indeed, it is in these areas that the 
“Rehnquist Court” is most aptly named, for William Rehnquist was a 
leader of the Court’s doctrinal evolution in these areas in a number of 
ways.1 Despite the Court’s emphasis on federalism and constitutional 
criminal law, issues of First Amendment law remained consistently at 
the top of the docket in terms of importance. Over its two decades, 
the Rehnquist Court grappled with a host of fundamental First 
Amendment issues, involving a panoply of questions basic to any 
free society. Among many others, it addressed questions of flag 
burning,2 hate speech,3 sexually-explicit speech,4 speech in the digital 
environment,5 free speech versus the right to privacy,6 free speech 
and the regulation of intellectual property,7 the scope of the rights of 
expressive association8 and religious free exercise,9 and the 
prohibition on the establishment of religion.10 
The papers collected in this volume represent an attempt to take 
stock of developments in these and other areas of First Amendment 
 
 1. See, e.g., THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig Bradley ed., 2005). 
 2. Texas v. Johnson, 497 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 3. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992). 
 4. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 6. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 7. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 8. Boy Scouts v. Dale, 528 U.S. 1109 (2000). 
 9. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 10. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
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law over the past two decades from a variety of methodological and 
ideological perspectives. They are the product of a symposium held 
at the Washington University School of Law on November 18, 2005. 
The live conference took the form of a series of principal papers, 
followed in many cases by discussion of the papers by assigned 
commentators. This symposium volume follows a similar 
organization. 
The first group of symposium papers addresses the particular 
problems for free speech theory and doctrine posed by technological 
change. The last two decades have seen rapid and unprecedented 
developments in electronic communications technologies, which 
have become increasingly important media by which individuals 
exercise their First Amendment rights of speech and press. At the 
same time, this information revolution has posed new and important 
questions about what legal rules apply to electronic information flows 
such as web sites and web logs, wireless telephony, peer-to-peer file 
sharing, or the sale of customer data. Unsurprisingly, the Rehnquist 
Court confronted these issues in a number of important cases, 
addressing such critical questions as the relationship between free 
speech and intellectual property11 and the power of Congress to 
regulate the content of speech on the new medium of the Internet.12 
A number of symposium papers survey and challenge these 
developments. Mark McKenna assesses the role that the First 
Amendment played in the Rehnquist Court’s intellectual property 
cases.13 McKenna suggests that although the Rehnquist Court 
attempted to reconcile IP with the First Amendment, the way it did so 
has ironically set the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of IP 
in the future.  
John Palfrey and Robert Rogoyski examine the Internet technical 
principle of “end-to-end design,” whereby regulation of information 
flow occurs at the “ends” of the network—i.e., the senders and 
recipients of information—rather than in the “middle,” with Internet 
 
 11. Eldred, 537 U.S. 186. 
 12. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 13. Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2006). 
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Service Providers and other technical intermediaries.14 Palfrey and 
Rogoyski contend that the end-to-end principle favored by 
technologists and democratic activists is threatened by the needs of 
law enforcement in regulating “harmful” speech. They argue that this 
threat is harmful to both the technical and democratic values that the 
end-to-end principle embodies. Moreover, they claim, the “move to 
the middle” has resulted in intermediary corporations that might not 
always hold the most progressive views on expressive liberties 
becoming deputized as the state’s enforcers of information flows.  
Commenting on Palfrey and Rogoyski, Thomas Nachbar argues 
that some regulation of the human-created digital world is inevitable, 
and that the end-to-end principle, rather than being a democratic 
design choice, is instead the product of an unaccountable institutional 
consensus by Internet engineers.15 This technical choice itself has 
political ramifications, and Nachbar contends that institutions as well 
as outcomes should be taken into account when making regulatory 
choices. He suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence, which itself recognized the institutional dimensions of 
speech regulation, points the way for more effective regulation of 
digital information flows in the future. 
Other symposium papers examining issues of freedom of 
expression assess Rehnquist Court free speech jurisprudence from a 
variety of methodological approaches, and reach divergent 
conclusions regarding the role of ideology in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Leading political scientists Lee Epstein and Jeffrey 
Segal present an empirical analysis of the entirety of modern free 
speech jurisprudence.16 They conclude that although most accounts 
of First Amendment jurisprudence explicitly link support for First 
Amendment claimants of speech, press, or associational rights with 
ideological “liberalism,” the Rehnquist Court First Amendment cases 
cast some doubt upon this conclusion. Epstein and Segal argue that 
data drawn from 1953 through 2004 show that, in general, the more 
 
 14. John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: The Enduring 
Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to End Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2006). 
 15. Thomas B. Nachbar, Speech and Institutional Choice, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67 
(2006). 
 16. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 81 (2006). 
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liberal a Justice’s ideology, the more likely that the Justice would 
vote for a First Amendment claimant. However, in cases in which 
free speech was in conflict with another value, such as privacy or 
equality, liberal Justices were no more likely than conservative 
Justices to vote in favor of free speech claims. In fact, Epstein and 
Segal suggest that in such “value-conflict” cases, it appears to be 
liberals who tend to favor regulation and conservatives who support 
First Amendment claimants. Epstein and Segal argue that First 
Amendment commitments are thus no longer synonymous with 
ideological liberalism, a finding that unsettles much of the political 
science work in this area.  
Using wholly different methodology, Robert Sedler assesses First 
Amendment jurisprudence’s uneasy relationship between 
constitutional and property rights from the perspective of a trial 
litigator.17 Sedler argues that First Amendment law in this area has 
two effects: it allows speakers to interfere with property rights on the 
one hand, and allows property owners to claim a First Amendment-
based immunity from some forms of otherwise valid regulation on 
the other. Sedler claims, in sharp contrast to Epstein and Segal, that 
“in the area of the First Amendment, the so-called ‘liberal-
conservative’ divisions that may appear in other areas are generally 
absent.”18  
Shelley Ross Saxer critiques Sedler’s argument from the 
perspective of land use law.19 Saxer suggests that Sedler’s analysis, 
rather than showing the strength of the First Amendment, reveals 
instead the weakened state of contemporary property rights and the 
difficulties faced by private land owners seeking to exclude 
trespassers and others who interfere with their land use by claiming 
an expressive privilege. 
Property rights, though, are but one of several lenses we can use 
to think about the places where we speak and express ourselves. In a 
provocative essay, Timothy Zick argues that free expression demands 
a breathing space that can be constrained by narrow conceptions of 
 
 17. Robert A. Sedler, Property and Speech, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 123 (2006). 
 18. Id. at 125. 
 19. Shelley Ross Saxer, A Property Rights View: Commentary on Property and Speech by 
Robert A. Sedler, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155 (2006). 
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place, property, or other architectural concepts that structure our 
communicative environment.20 Zick suggests that the Rehnquist 
Court free speech decisions left what he calls our “expressive 
topography” markedly worse than they found it, by allowing new 
kinds of content-based regulation of speech on streets and sidewalks 
and by permitting new anti-speech government tactics such as 
“expressive zoning” of adult businesses. In a society in which 
traditional public spaces are being privatized or moved into new 
contexts entirely, Zick urges us to broaden our notions of speech and 
space so that public discourse can be preserved in both public and 
private places. 
Of course, issues of free expression are only one side of First 
Amendment law, which also protects both the right to the free 
exercise of religion as well as the right of the people to be free from 
government establishment of religion. If the story of the Rehnquist 
Court’s free speech jurisprudence was characterized by the 
application of established theory, norms and doctrinal categories to 
new contexts, its Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence was quite different. In its religion cases, the Rehnquist 
Court showed a much greater willingness to re-examine existing law 
from first (often originalist) principles, and effected a marked change 
in both areas of the law. On the Free Exercise side, the Court made 
clear that religious liberty did not include the right to be exempt from 
neutral and generally-applicable laws, even when those laws 
prohibited activities central to a religious faith.21 And on the 
Establishment Clause side, the Court cut back on earlier doctrinal and 
theoretical understandings that the First Amendment mandated a 
strict separation between church and state.22 Although it remained 
superficially faithful to the doctrinal mechanism inherited from 
Lemon v. Kurtzman23 for policing the Establishment Clause’s 
boundaries from state overreaching, the Court increasingly came to 
adopt Justice O’Connor’s view that church and state need not be 
 
 20. Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173 
(2006). 
 21. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 22. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10. 
 23. 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
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strictly separate as long as the government did not go so far as to 
endorse one religion over others.24 
Reflecting the deep ideological disagreement that frequently 
characterized the Rehnquist Court’s religion clause cases, the 
symposium papers dealing with these issues generate a lively and 
spirited debate. Abner Greene provides a helpful point of departure 
for this discussion by surveying the religion clause case law.25 
Greene notes that the Rehnquist Court religion clause cases reflect an 
“apparent consistency” insofar as they stand for the principle that 
government can benefit or burden religion, at least as long as the 
government acts in a general manner and does not single out a 
particular religion (or religion in general) for special benefits or 
burdens. Despite this apparent consistency, Greene contends that 
there are outlier cases in which the Court upheld special burdens or 
special benefits for religion. These outlier cases, he argues, reveal a 
deep inconsistency in religion clause doctrine caused in part by the 
fact that religion is distinctive; a fact that the government needs to 
take into account in order to allow all people to participate in 
government as full citizens regardless of their religious beliefs.  
Jay Wexler ruminates on what he calls “the Endorsement Court,” 
a reference to Justice O’Connor’s reformulation of Establishment 
Clause doctrine that has generated extensive critical scholarly 
commentary.26 Wexler agrees with two dimensions of the critical 
literature: first, that the endorsement test favors more established 
religious traditions over minority ones; and second, that its 
indeterminacy and manipulability threaten the integrity of the federal 
judiciary. To answer these two critiques, Wexler proposes the 
avowedly radical solution that Congress create a true “Endorsement 
Court”: an Article I tribunal staffed by experts in a variety of 
religious traditions that could decide endorsement challenges to 
 
 24. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627–32 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The test itself was first propounded by 
Justice O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Pawtucket case involving a crèche surrounded by 
more secular winter holiday imagery. See 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 25. Abner S. Greene, The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause Doctrine, 21 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 225 (2006). 
 26. Jay D. Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263 (2006). 
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public religious displays subject only to review by the Supreme Court 
on writ of certiorari.  
Responding to Wexler’s arguments, Thomas Berg is sympathetic 
to the advantages of having educated arbiters deciding endorsement 
questions, but is skeptical of the proposal, both in terms of logistics 
and the “no-endorsement” test it would be charged with applying.27  
The final pair of papers assess the very legitimacy of the changes 
wrought by the Rehnquist Court in the religion cases. Arguing that 
the Rehnquist Court’s religion clause case law embodies a vision of 
the law at odds with previously settled law, Garrett Epps presents a 
deeply critical analysis of that vision.28 Epps notes:  
[T]he Court has used the ambiguous idea of equality to create a 
remarkable shift—one that is not even remotely tied to the text 
or history of the Religion Clauses. Though the shift relies on 
dribs and drabs of judicial rhetoric in earlier cases, it is 
resolutely scornful of precedent. It is not an evolution, or a 
refinement, or a correction. It is, or aspires to be, 
transformative: it is something brand new.29 
 Responding to Epps’ paper, Eric Claeys agrees that the Rehnquist 
Court effected a transformation in religion clause jurisprudence, but 
disagrees with Epps’ normative and positive characterizations of the 
transformation.30 Claeys observes that much of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and scholarship depends upon prior commitments 
about the nature of law, society, and the judicial interpretive role. 
Claeys critiques Epps from the perspective of an avowed “religionist” 
(who believes that the First Amendment does not compel strict 
separation between religious beliefs and public institutions) and 
originalist (who believes that the historical record should inform and 
constrain constitutional interpretation). In Claeys’ view, the original 
intent of the religion clauses affords legal legitimacy to a far more 
 
 27. Thomas C. Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement,” 21 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 307 (2006). 
 28. Garrett Epps, Some Animals Are More Equal than Others: The Rehnquist Court and 
“Majority Religion,” 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 323 (2006). 
 29. Id. at 325. 
 30. Eric R. Claeys, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses: A Comment on Professor 
Epps, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2006). 
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integrated relationship between church and state than Epps’ 
separationist account would permit. Moreover, this competing 
originalist vision has much to commend it as a matter of policy. 
Taken together, the symposium papers collected in this volume 
have much to say about the role of law, technology, history, and 
social norms in the development of modern First Amendment law. 
The diversity of ideological and methodological perspectives offered 
reveals that the lively debate in these areas of Constitutional law 
shows no signs of abating. This should, of course, be no surprise. The 
issues raised by the First Amendment are those of the highest 
importance and complexity, and they are ones with which every 
democratic society must inevitably and continually struggle. It is a 
fitting irony that the legal commitments to free speech, thought, 
belief, and inquiry protected by the First Amendment are the same 
ones we must use to answer the critical questions it forces us to 
confront. 
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